Abstract-Game theory has emerged as a novel approach for the coordination of multiagent systems. A fundamental component of this approach is the design of a local utility function for each agent so that their selfish maximization achieves the global objective. In this paper we propose a novel framework to characterize and optimize the worst case performance (price of anarchy) of any resulting equilibrium as a function of the chosen utilities, thus providing a performance certificate for a large class of algorithms. More specifically, we consider a class of resource allocation problems, where each agent selects a subset of the resources with the goal of maximizing a welfare function. First, we show that any smoothness argument is inconclusive for the design problems considered. Motivated by this, we introduce a new approach providing a tight expression for the price of anarchy (PoA) as a function of the chosen utility functions. Leveraging this result, we show how to design the utilities so as to maximize the PoA through a tractable linear program.
presence of heterogenous decision makers and informational constraints. The above mentioned problem is typically posed as an optimization problem (finite or infinite dimensional), where the system-level objective is captured by an objective function (functional), while physical laws and informational availability are incorporated as constraints on the decision variables. The design is complete once a distributed decision making algorithm has been found, satisfying the constraints and maximising the objective function [8] , [9] .
A well-established and fruitful approach to tackle this problem consists in the design of a centralized maximization algorithm, that is later distributed by leveraging the structure of the problem considered. Examples in continuous optimization include algorithms such as distributed gradient ascent, primaldual and Newton's method [10] , [11] .
A different and promising approach, termed game design, has recently emerged as a tool to complement the partial understanding offered by more traditional techniques [12] . Rather than directly specifying a decision-making process, local utility functions are assigned to the agents, so that their selfish maximization translates in the achievement of the system level objective. The potential of this technique stems from the possibility to inherit a pool of algorithms that are distributed by nature, asynchronous, and resilient to external disturbance [13] . The game design approach is tightly connected with the notion of equilibrium in game theory, and its origin stems from a novel engineering perspective on this field. Given an optimization problem we wish to solve distributedly, the game design procedure proposed in [12] , [14] is summarized in Figure 1 and consists in the following steps: 1 1) Utility design: assign an equilibrium concept for the game and utility functions to each agent. 2) Algorithm design: devise a distributed algorithm to guide agents to the chosen equilibrium concept.
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Distributed algorithm with performance guarantees The objective of the game design procedure is to obtain an efficient and distributed algorithm for the solution of the original optimization problem. While the introduction of an auxiliary equilibrium problem might seem artificial at first, this approach has recently produced a host of new results [15] [16] [17] , and will be fruitful here too. Observe that, in order for the game design procedure to be relevant to the original optimization problem, the utility functions need to be carefully designed so that the chosen equilibrium (equilibria) coincide with the global optimizer(s) of the original problem, or is provably close to. It is important to highlight that we are not modeling agents as competing units, but we are rather designing their utilities to achieve the global objective.
While the field of learning in games offers readily available algorithms to coordinate agents towards an equilibrium in a distributed fashion (i.e. they address the second step of Figure 1 ) [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] , the utility design problem is much less tracked. Additionally, even if the body of research quantifying the inefficiency of equilibria is vast (e.g. the smoothness framework of [24] ), these results are not suited for the design problem considered here. 2 Furthermore, the problem of designing utility functions so as to maximize such efficiency measure has been studied only in special cases [25] , [26] .
The overarching goal of this manuscript is to provide a framework to compute the equilibrium efficiency as a function of the given utility functions, and to optimally select utilities so as to maximize this quantity.
Model. In this paper, we focus on a class of resource allocation problems, where each agent selects a subset of resources with the goal of maximizing a prespecified welfare function. The latter is assumed to be additive with respect to the resources. Resource allocation problems are ubiquitous in engineering and computer science. Their applications include but are not limited to sensor allocation problems [16] , Adwords for ecommerce [27] , vehicle-target assignment [13] as well as charging of electric vehicles [28] . While the performance of an algorithm is typically gauged by several dimensions, including the stability and efficacy of the transient behavior, we measure its quality with the worst case steady-state performance. The latter is captured by the concept of price of anarchy (PoA) [29] . Informally, the price of anarchy provides performance guarantees associated with the worst performing equilibrium of the designed game relative to an optimal allocation. In all the forthcoming analysis, we consider the solution concept of pure Nash equilibrium.
Contributions. Our main contributions are as follows. 1) We show that the (λ, µ)-smoothness framework typically used to bound the price of anarchy [24] is inconclusive in our setting and is not suited for the utility design problems considered here. 3 More precisely, we show that the efficiency bounds obtained using a smoothness argument are rather conservative (Theorem 1). 2 Throughout the manuscript, we use the expression "efficiency of an equilibrium" to indicate the ratio between the objective value at that equilibrium and the optimal objective value. 3 The smoothness framework is one of the most common set of tools used to bound the equilibrium efficiency. It has been used to provide tight efficiency bounds for e.g., routing games and combinatorial auctions. See [30] , [31] .
2) Relative to the class of resource allocation problems considered here, we resolve the problem of computing the exact (i.e. tight) price of anarchy (PoA) by means of a tractable linear program in its primal (Theorem 2) and dual form (Theorem 3). The latter program features only 2 decision variables, O(n 2 ) constraints and thus can be solved efficiently. 4 3) We solve the problem of designing utility functions so as to maximize the efficiency (price of anarchy) of the corresponding game. We show that this design problem can also be posed as a tractable linear program in n + 1 variables and O(n 2 ) constraints (Theorem 4). The upshot of our contributions is the possibility to apply the game design procedure to a broad class of problems: we are now able to provide performance guarantees for a given set of utility functions, and we can perform optimal utility design.
With this respect, Part II specializes the results presented here and demonstrates their applicability by means of two applications.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Subsections II-A and II-B contain the problem formulation, as well as the game theoretic approach and the corresponding performance metrics (price of anarchy). Section III provides connections with related works. Section IV revisits the smoothness framework and shows its inapplicability to the utility design problem considered. Section V shows how to reformulate the problems of characterizing and optimizing the price of anarchy as tractable linear programs.
Notation. For any two positive integers p ≤ q, denote [p] = {1, . . . , p} and [p, q] = {p, . . . , q} We use N, R >0 and R ≥0 to denote the set of natural numbers, positive and non negative real numbers, respectively. The function 1 {f (x)≥0} assumes value 1 if f (x) ≥ 0, and zero else. Given a finite set I, |I| denotes the number of elements in I.
II. MODEL AND PERFORMANCE METRICS
A. Problem formulation
Consider R = {r 1 , . . . , r m } a finite set of resources, where each resource r ∈ R is associated with a value v r ≥ 0 describing its importance. Further let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents. Every agent i ∈ N selects a i , a subset of the resources, from the given collection A i ⊆ 2 R , i.e. a i ∈ A i . The welfare of an allocation a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A = A 1 × · · · × A n is given by
where W : 2 R × · · · × 2 R → R, |a| r = |{i ∈ N s.t. r ∈ a i }| captures the number of agents selecting resource r in allocation a, and w : [n] → R ≥0 is called the welfare basis function. Informally, w scales the value of each resource depending on how many agents selected it.
The objective of the system designer is to find a feasible allocation maximizing the welfare, i.e a opt ∈ arg max a∈A W (a) .
We will often represent an allocation a as (a i , a −i ), where a −i = (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n ) denotes the decision of all the agents but i.
B. Utility design and corresponding performance metrics
Within the combinatorial framework studied in this paper, finding a feasible allocation that maximizes W (a) is known to be a hard problem. Even when assuming monotonicity and submodularity of W , the problem remains hard, and indeed a generic instance is hard to approximate within any ratio better than 1 − 1/e [32] , where e is the Euler's number. Based on such observation, this work focus on deriving efficient and distributed algorithms for attaining approximate solutions to the maximization of (1), ideally with the best possible ratio. While under suitable technical conditions centralized algorithms are available to accomplish this task [32] , the focus is placed here on distributed algorithms. In the following, each agent is assumed to have information only regarding the resources that he can select, i.e. regarding the resources r ∈ A i ⊆ R. Agents are requested to make independent choices in response to this local piece of information. Rather than directly specifying a decision-making process as typically done in the literature, we adopt the game design approach discussed in the introduction and depicted in Figure 1 .
In the remainder of this work we focus on its first component i.e. on the utility design problem. The latter amounts to the choice of local utility functions that adhere to the above mentioned informational constraints, and whose corresponding equilibria offer the highest achievable performance. Towards this goal, each agent is assigned a local utility function u i : A → R ≥0 of the form
where f : [n] → R ≥0 describes the fractional benefit of v r w(|a| r ) that each agent receives by selecting resource r in allocation a. The function f constitutes our only design choice; we refer to it as to the distribution rule.
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Observe that each utility function in (2) satisfies the required informational constraints in that it only depends on the value of the resources that the agent selected, the distribution rule f and the number of agents that selected the very same resource. In the remaining of this paper, we focus on the solution concept of pure Nash equilibrium, which we will refer to as just an equilibrium.
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium, [33] ). An allocation a ne ∈ A is a pure Nash equilibrium if u i (a ne ) ≥ u i (a i , a ne −i ) for all alternative allocations a i ∈ A i and for all agents i ∈ N . 5 A different and apparently less restrictive choice might entail assigning different distribution rules to different players. However, it is possible to show that working in this larger set of admissible utility functions will not improve the best achievable performance. While we do not provide a proof of this statement, a similar conclusions was found in [26] . For this reason, in the followings we focus on utility functions of the form (2).
We identify the game introduced above with the tuple
and for ease of notation remove the subscripts of the above sets, e.g., use {A i } instead of {A i } i∈N . It is important to highlight that for the class of games with utility functions (2) , an equilibrium allocation is guaranteed to exist, as G is known to be a congestion game [34] . In the remaining of this manuscript, we require a system operator to robustly design a distribution rule, that is to design f without any prior information regarding the resource set R, the value of the resources {v r } or the action sets of the agents {A i }. The only datum available to the system designer is an upper bound on the number of players in the game i.e. |N | ≤ n. This request stems from the observation that the previous pieces of information may be unreliable, or unavailable to the system designer due to, e.g., communication restrictions or privacy concerns. Formally, given a distribution rule f , we introduce the following family of games
containing all possible games G where the number of agents is bounded by n. In the forthcoming analysis, we restrict our attention to the class of games where the number of players is exactly n. This is without loss of generality. Indeed the latter class of games and the class of games where the number of players is upper bounded by n have the same price of anarchy. 6 We measure the performance of a distribution rule f adapting the well known concept of price of anarchy [29] as
where NE(G) denotes the set of Nash equilibria of G. While the optimal value at the denominator of (4) also depends on the instance G considered, we do not indicate it explicitly, for ease of presentation. The quantity PoA(f ) characterizes the efficiency of the worst-performing Nash equilibrium relative to the the corresponding optimal allocation, over all possible instances in the class G f . According to the previous definition, 0 ≤ PoA(f ) ≤ 1 and the higher the price of anarchy, the better performance certificates we can offer. Observe that whenever an algorithm is available to compute one such equilibrium, the price of anarchy also represents the approximation ratio of the corresponding algorithm over all the instances G ∈ G f . The utility design problem can be decomposed in two tasks:
i) providing a bound (or ideally an exact characterization) of the price of anarchy as a function of f ; ii) optimizing this expression over the admissible distribution rules.
In Section IV and Subsections V-A, V-B, V-C we address i), while in Subsection V-D we turn the attention to ii).
III. RELATED WORKS
The use of game theoretic learning algorithms for the distributed solution of optimization problems has been proposed in [13] , and since then a number of works have followed a similar approach [35] [36] [37] . We redirect the reader to [38] for a general overview on equilibrium learning algorithms in distributed control. What has been less understood so far, is how to provide performance certificates for a given set of utility functions. In this respect, efficiency bounds are either limited to specific problems, e.g., concave cost sharing, reverse carpooling problems [25] , [39] or confined to particular design methodologies such as the Shapley value or marginal contribution [40] , [41] .
The performance degradation of an equilibrium allocation compared to the optimal solution has been subject of intense research in the field of algorithmic game theory (through the notions of price of anarchy, price of stability [29] , [42] ). Nevertheless, the results available therein are not helpful for the design problem studied here. The widely used smoothness framework proposed in [24] has proved useful in bringing a number of different results under a common language and has produced tightness guarantees for different problems [24] , [31] . Nevertheless, the latter framework requires the sum of the utility functions to be equal (or less equal) to the welfare function (budget-balance condition). While this assumption is well justified for a number of problems modeled through game theory (e.g., cost sharing games [43] ), it has little bearing on the design of local utility functions studied here.
The problem of designing local utility functions so as to maximize the efficiency of the emerging equilibria find its roots in the economic literature relative to the design of optimal taxations [44] . The approach has been applied to the design of engineering systems only recently. With respect to such systems, the utility design problem lacks a general framework.
The idea of using an auxiliary linear program (LP) to study the equilibrium efficiency has appeared in very few works in the literature [45] [46] [47] [48] . Note that, all the aforementioned works assume the budget-balance condition to hold true. In [45] , the authors pose the problem in an abstract form and the corresponding linear program is used as a conceptual tool, rather than as a machinery to explicitly compute the price of anarchy. While [46] provides result for polynomial latency functions in weighted congestion games, the techniques proposed in [46] [47] [48] require an ad-hoc bound on the dual objective to obtain a bound on the price of anarchy. This is not the case with our approach. Additionally, we note that the linear programming reformulations of [45] capture the price of anarchy for a given problem instance, while in this work we consider the worst case instance over an admissible class of problems. This additional requirement complicates the analysis, but will produce algorithms that are provably robust to the presence of uncertainty, and are thus better suited for engineering implementation. Finally, we observe that a direct transposition of the approach in e.g., [45] to our setting would produce a linear program whose size grows exponentially in the number of resources, making it impossible to solve for real world applications.
IV. THE SMOOTHNESS FRAMEWORK AND ITS LIMITATIONS
In this section we recall the definition of smooth games, and show that the corresponding best achievable bounds on the price of anarchy are not tight, but rather conservative when applied to utility design problems. The notion of smooth game has been introduced in [24] and has been successively employed to obtain tight bounds on the price of anarchy for different classes of games.
Definition 2 (Smooth Game). The utility-maximization game G in (3) together with the welfare function (1) is (λ, µ)-smooth if for some λ, µ ≥ 0 it holds
The following lemma provides a lower bound on the ratio between the total welfare at any Nash equilibrium and the optimum, relative to the specific instance G considered.
Proposition 1 ([24]
). Consider a (λ, µ)-smooth game with
While the result reported in Proposition 1 is limited to Nash equilibria, the bound (6) holds for a significantly larger class of equilibria, known as coarse correlated equilibria [24] . The strength of the smoothness framework is, amongst others, in the recipe it provides to obtain performance bounds for a large class of equilibria.
Note that the smoothness framework forces us to restrict the attention to utilities satisfying i∈N u i (a) ≤ W (a), else no guarantee is provided by Lemma 1. This corresponds to requesting f (j) ≤ 1/j. Thus, in the remaining of this section only, we consider utilities satisfying this constraint.
The next lemma shows that when we are allowed to freely choose the players' utilities (i.e. if we are interested in design problems), the best achievable smoothness guarantee is obtained when i∈N u i (a) = W (a) for all a.
for all a ∈ A. If the game with utilitiesũ i (a) is (λ, µ)-smooth, then the game with utilities u i (a) is also (λ, µ)-smooth.
Proof. By assumption the game with utilitiesũ i (a) is (λ, µ)-smooth and i u i (a) ≥ iũ i (a), so that for all a, a ∈ A
Thus, the game with utilities u i (a) is (λ, µ)-smooth too.
Lemma 1 suggest to design utilities that are budgetbalanced, in that sub budget-balanced utilities can never be advantageous with regards to the performance guarantees associated with smoothness. 7 This observation turns out to 7 The statement of Lemma 1 holds true in general and does not depend on the specific form of the utility functions or of the welfare considered here. be misleading, in that there are utility functions that are sub budget-balanced, but give a better performance certificate than what the smoothness argument can offer, as shown next.
Consider f a distribution rule satisfying f (j) ≤ 1/j for all j ∈ [n], the best bound on the price of anarchy (4) that can be obtained via smoothness, is given by the solution to the following program
Observe that SPoA(f ) ≤ PoA(f ) as Proposition 1 provides only a bound on the equilibrium efficiency. In the following we show that the best smoothness bound captured by SPoA(f ) is not representative of the "true" price of anarchy PoA(f ) defined in (4) . To do so, we illustrate the gap between these two quantities in the special case of set covering problems [26] . Set covering problems are a special class of the resource allocation problems considered here. They are obtained setting w(j) = 1 for all j ∈ [n]. Before stating the result, we introduce the distribution rule
as originally defined in [26, equation (5)].
Theorem 1 (Limitations of the smoothness framework).
Consider the class of set covering problems i.e. fix w(j) = 1.
i) For any choice of f , the best bound on the price of anarchy that can be achieved using a smoothness argument is
ii) The distribution (7) satisfies f gar (j) ≤ 1/j and achieves
where e is Euler's number. iii) For all n > 2, SPoA(f gar ) < PoA(f gar ) .
The proof of the claims i) and iii) is reported in the Appendix. The claim ii) is instead proven in [26] .
The quantity b(n) bounding the best possible performance certificate offered by the smoothness framework, and the guarantee offered by the "true" price of anarchy for f gar are presented in Figure 2 (left) . Additionally, the distribution rules f gar (j) and 1/j are depicted in Figure 2 (right). The gap between b(n) and PoA(f gar ) is significant: for a system with e.g., n = 20 agents, PoA(f gar ) produces a performance certificate that is at least 25% higher than what SPoA(f gar ) can offer. Thus, the smoothness framework is not the right tool to study the utility design problems considered here. First, it restricts the set of admissible distribution rule to f (j) ≤ 1/j. Second, even for distribution rules satisfying this assumption, it provides performance certificates that are too conservative. Finally, we observe that the notion of local smoothness (a refinement of the original notion introduced in [49] ) will not be useful here in improving SPoA. 
V. A NOVEL FRAMEWORK TO COMPUTE AND OPTIMIZE THE PRICE OF ANARCHY
In the previous section we have highlighted the limitations of the smoothness framework when applied to utility design problems. In this section we propose a novel approach for the exact characterization and optimization of PoA(f ) as defined in (4). More precisely, we reformulate both the problems of computing and optimizing the price of anarchy as tractable linear programs involving the components of w and of f . This section is dedicated to the problem of characterizing and optimizing the price of anarchy in its full generality. The expressions obtained are provably tight and connect with a number of works in the field of algorithmic game theory studying the efficiency of equilibria.
Throughout the manuscript and in all the forthcoming analysis, we make the following regularity assumptions on admissible welfare basis functions and distribution rules.
Standing Assumptions
The sets A i ⊆ 2 R are nonempty and A i \ ∅ = ∅ for all i ∈ N . Further, ∃r ∈ R s.t. v r > 0 and r ∈ a i ∈ A i for some i ∈ N . The welfare basis function w :
. The latter is equivalent to f ∈ F, upon defining
The non-emptiness of A i ensures feasibility of the welfare maximization introduced in Section II-A. The assumptions A i \ ∅ = ∅ for all i ∈ N and ∃r ∈ R s.t. v r > 0 ensure that the problem is non degenerate, in that every agent has the possibility to select at least one resource, and not all the resources have a value of zero. Finally, observe that the assumption f (1) ≥ 1 is without loss of generality for all distributions with f (1) > 0. Indeed, If f (1) = 1, but f (1) > 0, it is possible to scale the value of the resources and reduce to the case f (1) = 1.
A. An informal introduction
While Equation (4) corresponds to the definition of price of anarchy, it also describes a (seemingly difficult) optimization problem. The aim of this section, is to transform the definition of price of anarchy into a finite dimensional linear program that can be efficiently solved. Towards this goal, we provide here an informal introduction (based on four steps), as we believe the reader will benefit from it. The formal derivation and justification of each of these steps is postponed to Theorem 2 and its proof.
Step 1: we observe that the price of anarchy computed over the family of games G ∈ G f is the same of the price of anarchy over the reduced family of gamesĜ f , where the feasible set of every player only contains two allocations: (worst) equilibrium and optimal allocation, that isÂ i = {a ne i , a opt i }, G f := {(R, {v r }, N, {Â i }, f )} and definition (4) reduces to
This is because the infimum overĜ f and the parametrization we will introduce to describe an instanceĜ (in step 4) will implicitly ensure this.
Step 2: we assume without loss of generality that W (a ne ) = 1 and fold the inf and max operator to get
Step 3: we relax the previous program as in the following
where the n equilibrium constraints (one per each player) have been substituted by their sum. We show that the relaxation gives the same price of anarchy of (8).
Step 4: For a given instance in the reduced familyĜ f , computing the efficiency amounts to identifying an optimal allocation and the corresponding worst Nash equilibrium. The additional difficulty appearing in (9) is in how to describe a generic instance G ∈Ĝ f and on how to compute the infimum over all such (infinite) instances. To do so, we introduce an efficient parametrization that fully describes the objective function and the decision variables of the previous problem. This allows to reduce (9) and obtain the result in the following Theorem 2.
B. The linear program reformulation
The following theorem makes the reasoning presented in Subsection V-A formal and constitutes the second result of this manuscript.
In order to capture all the instances inĜ f , we use a parametrization inspired by [50] and introduce the variables θ(a, x, b) ∈ R defined for any tuple of integers (a, x, b) ∈ I, where
Note that I R contains all the integer points on the planes a = 0, b = 0, x = 0, a + x + b = n bounding I. In the remainder of this manuscript we write a,x,b instead of (a,x,b)∈I , for readability. Additionally, given a distribution rule f : [n] → R ≥0 , and a welfare basis function w : [n] → R >0 , we extend their definition, with slight abuse of notation, to f : [0, n + 1] → R ≥0 and w : [0, n+1] → R ≥0 , where we set the first and last components to be identically zero, i.e. f (0) = w(0) = 0, f (n + 1) = w(n + 1) = 0. 
The proof is reported in the Appendix and is based on the four steps discussed in Subsection V-A.
Given a distribution rule f , the solution to the previous program returns both the price of anarchy, and the corresponding worst case instance (encoded in θ(a, x, b), see the proof of the Step 4 in the Appendix). Observe that the number of decision variables in (10) is |I| = 1 2 n j=0 (j + 2)(j + 1) ∼ O(n 3 ), while only two scalar constraints are present (neglecting the positivity constraint). The previous program can thus already be solved efficiently. Nevertheless, we are only interested in the expression of PoA(f ) (i.e. ultimately in the value of the program), and therefore consider the dual counterpart of (10) in the following.
C. The dual reformulation
Thanks to strong duality, it suffices to solve the dual program of (10) to compute the price of anarchy (4) . While the dual program should feature two scalar decision variables and O(n 3 ) constraints, the following Theorem shows how to reduce the number of constraints to only |I R | = 2(n 2 + 1) ∼ O(n 2 ). The overarching goal is to progress towards an explicit expression for PoA(f ).
Theorem 3 (Dual reformulation of PoA). Given f ∈ F, the price of anarchy (4) is PoA(f ) = 1/W , where W is the value of the following (dual) program
The proof of the previous Theorem (reported in the Appendix) suggests that a further simplification can be made when f (j)w(j) is non-increasing for all j. In this case the number of constraints reduces to exactly n 2 , as detailed in the following corollary. Corollary 1. Consider a given f ∈ F. i) Assume f (j)w(j) non increasing for j ∈ [n]. Then PoA = 1/W , where
.
Mimicking the proof of the previous corollary (reported in the Appendix), it is possible to obtain a similar result when f (j)w(j) is instead non-decreasing. The result is not reported here in the interest of conciseness. Remark 1. Observe that, if the optimal value λ is known a priori, as in the second statement from the previous corollary, the quantity W (and consequently the price of anarchy) can be computed explicitly from (12) as the maximum between n 2 real numbers depending on all the entries of f and w. To see this, divide both sides of the constraints in (12) by w(j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and observe that the solution µ is then found as the maximum of the resulting right hand side. The corresponding value of W is given by the following expression.
(13) Equation (13) is reminiscent of the result obtained using a very different approach in [40, Theorem 6] (limited to Shapley value) and [26, Theorem 3] (limited to set covering problems and sub budget-balanced utilities).
Finally, observe that for the case of set-covering problems discussed in Section IV (it is w(j) = 1 for all j ∈ [n]) the assumption i) in the previous corollary reduces to f (j) non increasing, while assumption ii) reads as f (j) ≥ f (1)/j. That is, the previous corollary gives us an explicit formula for PoA(f ) also for utilities that do not satisfy i∈N u i (a) ≤ W (a), as instead required in [26] . We discuss further connections with these results in Part II.
D. Optimizing the Price of Anarchy
Given w and a distribution rule f , Theorem 3 and Corollary 1 have reduced the computation of the price of anarchy to the solution of a tractable linear program. Nevertheless, determining the distribution rule maximizing PoA(f ), i.e. giving the best performance guarantees, is also a tractable linear program. The following theorem makes this clear. PoA(f ) is a linear program) . For a given welfare basis w, the design problem
Theorem 4 (Optimizing
is equivalent to the following LP in n + 1 scalar unknowns
The corresponding optimal price of anarchy is
where µ is the value of the program (14)
The proof is reported in the Appendix.
Remark 2. The importance of this results stems from its applicability for the game design procedure outlined in the Introduction and in Section II-B. As a matter of fact, Theorem 4 allows to compute the optimal distribution rule, for any given welfare basis function (satisfying the standing assumptions), and thus to solve the utility design problem. Applications of these results are presented in Part II of this work.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Motivated by resource allocation problems arising in multiagent and networked systems, we showed how to provide apriori performance guarantees for distributed algorithms based on a game theoretic approach. With this respect, the paper contains two fundamental results. First, we showed that computing the price of anarchy of a resource allocation problem (and thus the approximation ratio of any algorithm capable of determining a Nash equilibrium) is equivalent to solving a tractable linear program. Second, we showed how to select utility functions so as to maximize such efficiency measure by means of a tractable linear program. Proof. i) The claim in Proposition 1 requires f (j) ≤ 1/j, so that we have to restrict to this class of admissible utility functions to apply any smoothness argument. We proceed dividing the proof in two parts. First, we consider the valid distribution rule f SV defined for all j ∈ [n] as f SV (j) := 1/j, and show that the best smoothness parameters are (1, 1−1/n) so that SPoA(f SV ) = 1 2−1/n = b(n). Second, we show that for any distribution with f (j) ≤ f SV (j) for all j ∈ [n] it holds SPoA(f ) ≤ SPoA(f SV ). From this, we conclude SPoA(f ) ≤ b(n) = 1 2−1/n for all admissible distribution rules. Part 1: with the special choice of f SV , the proof of [26, Theorem 2] shows that for any pair of feasible a, a and any
where χ SV = max
from which χ SV = 1 − 1/n. Thus the game is (1, 1 − 1/n)-smooth and so SPoA(f SV ) ≥ 1 2−1/n . To show that there is no better pair (λ, µ) we show that the price of anarchy is exactly 1 2−1/n . To do so, we consider the instance G proposed in [16, Figure S2 ] and observe that W (a
Since the lower and upper bounds obtained for SPoA(f SV ) match, we conclude that SPoA(f SV ) = 1 2−1/n . Part 2: Consider any distribution rule f ∈ F such that f (j) ≤ f SV (j) for all j ∈ [n]. Let us define the set
and analogously for A(f SV ). With this notation, the claim we intend to prove reduces to
To show the latter, we prove that
∀a, a ∈ A, G ∈ G f . Thus (λ, µ) ∈ A(f SV ) too, from which we conclude that A(f ) ⊆ A(f SV ) and (15) must hold. iii) Follows from the previous claims upon noticing that b(n) < PoA(f gar ) for n > 2 (while b(n) = PoA(f gar ) for n = 2).
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof. The proof makes the steps 1-4 introduced in Subsection V-A formal, with particular attention to the steps 3-4.
Step 1: We intend to show that the price of anarchy computed over G ∈ G f is the same of the price of anarchy computed over a reduced set of games. Consider a game G ∈ G f and denote with a ne the corresponding worst equilibrium (as measured by W ) and with a opt an optimal allocation of G. For every such game G, we construct a new gameĜ, whereĜ := (R, {v r }, N,
That is, the feasible set of every player inĜ contains only two allocations: an optimal allocation, and the (worst) equilibrium of G. With slight abuse of notation we writeĜ(G) to describe the gameĜ constructed from G as just discussed. Observe that G andĜ have the same price of anarchy i.e.
Denote withĜ f the class of gamesĜ f := {Ĝ(G) ∀G ∈ G f } .
Observe thatĜ f ⊆ G f (by definition) and since for every game G ∈ G f , it is possible to construct a gameĜ ∈Ĝ f with the same price of anarchy, it follows that (4) can be computed as
Step 2: Lemma 2 ensures for any game G, every equilibrium configuration has strictly positive welfare. Thus, we assume without loss of generality that W (a ne ) = 1, where a ne represents the worst equilibrium of G.
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The price of anarchy reduces to
Step 3 and 4: While in Subsection V-A these steps have been introduced separately for ease of exposition, their proof is presented jointly here. First observe, from the last equation, that PoA(f ) = 1/W , where
We relax the previous program as in the following
where the n equilibrium constraints (one per each player) have been substituted by their sum. Thus, V ≥ W , but it also holds V ≤ W as Lemma 3 proves, so that V = W . In the following we show how to transform (17) in (10) by introducing the variables θ(a, x, b), (a, x, b) ∈ I. This parametrization has been introduced to study covering problems in [50] , and will be used here to efficiently represent the quantities appearing in (17) . To begin with, recall that each feasible set is composed of only two allocations, that isÂ i = {a ne i , a opt i }. For any given triplet (a, x, b) in I, we thus define θ(a, x, b) ∈ R ≥0 as the total value of resources that belong to precisely a + x of the sets a ne i , b + x of the sets a opt j , for which exactly x sets have the same index (i.e. i = j). These (n + 1)(n + 2)(n + 3)/6 variables suffice to fully describe the terms appearing in (17) . Indeed, extending the formulation of [50] to the welfare defined in (1) and the utilities defined in (2), it is possible to write
and the relaxed equilibrium constraint
Substituting the latter expressions in (17) , one gets
To transform the latter expression in (10) (i.e. the desired result) it suffices to show that the sup is attained. To see this observe that the decision variables θ(a, x, b) live in a compact space. Indeed θ(a, x, b) are constrained to the positive orthant for all (a, x, b) ∈ I. Additionally, the decision variables with a + x = 0 must be bounded due to the constraint W (a ne ) = 1
where w(j) = 0 by assumption. Finally, the decision variables left, i.e. those of the form θ(0, 0, b), b ∈ [n] are bounded due to the equilibrium constraint, which can be rewritten as
where f (1)w(1) = 0 by assumption.
Lemma 2. For any game G ∈ G f , it holds
Proof. Let us consider a fixed game G ∈ G f . By contradiction, let us assume that W (a ne ) = 0 for some a ne ∈ NE(G). It follows that all the players must have distributed themselves on resources that are either valued zero, or have selected the empty set allocation (since w(j) > 0). Thus, their utility function must also evaluate to zero. However, by standing assumptions, there exists a player p and a resource r ∈ a p ∈ A p with v r > 0. Observe that no other player is currently selecting this resource, else W (a ne ) > 0. If player p was to deviate and selected instead a p , his utility would be strictly positive (since f (1) > 0). Thus a ne is not an equilibrium: a contradiction. Repeating the same reasoning for all games G ∈ G f yields the claim.
Lemma 3. Consider W and V defined respectively in (16) and (17) . It holds that V ≤ W .
Proof. Since (17) is equivalent to (10) as shown in the proof of Theorem 2, we will work with (10) to prove V ≤ W . To do so, for any θ(a, x, b), (a, x, b) ∈ I feasible solution of (10) with value v, we will construct an instance of gamê G satisfying the constraints of the original problem (16) too. This allows to conclude that V ≤ W . To ease the notation we will use a,x,b in place of (a,x,b)∈I .
Consider θ(a, x, b), (a, x, b) ∈ I a feasible point for (10) with value v. For every (a, x, b) ∈ I and for each i ∈ N we create a resource r(a, x, b, i) and assign to it the value of θ(a, x, b)/n, i.e. v r(a,x,b,i) = θ(a, x, b)/n ∀i ∈ N . We then construct the gameĜ by defining ∀i ∈ N ,Â i = {a ne i , a opt i } and assigning the resources as follows
We begin by showing W (a ne ) = 1 and W (a opt ) = v. Aside from the cumbersome definition of g and h, it is not difficult to verify that for any fixed resource (i.e. for every fixed tuple (a, x, b, j)), there are exactly a + x (resp. b + x) players selecting it while at the equilibrium (resp. optimum) allocation. It follows that
With an identical reasoning, one shows that
Finally, we prove that a ne is indeed an equilibrium, i.e. it satisfies
Towards this goal, we recall that the game under consideration is a congestion game with potential φ :
ne −i ) and so we equivalently prove that
Thanks to the previous observation, according to which every resource (a, x, b, j) is covered by exactly a + x players at the equilibrium, we have chosen by the same number of agents. It follows that
where the inequality holds because θ(a, x, b) is assumed feasible for (10) . This concludes the proof.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof. We divide the proof in two steps: i) writing the dual of the original program in Equation (10); ii) showing that only the constraints obtained for (a, x, b) ∈ I R are binding. i) Upon stacking the decision variables θ(a, x, b) in the vector y ∈ R , = (n + 3)(n + 2)(n + 1)/6, and after properly defining the coefficients c, d, e ∈ R , the program (10) can be compactly written as
The Lagrangian function is defined for 
By strong duality 10 , the value of (10) matches (18) . ii) In this step we show that only the constraints with (a, x, b) ∈ I R are necessary in (18) , thus obtaining (11) .
Observe that when (a, x, b) ∈ I and a + x = 0, b can take any value 1 ≤ b ≤ n, and these indices are already included in I R . Similarly for the indices (a, x, b) ∈ I with b + x = 0. Thus, we focus on the remaining constraints, i.e. those with a + x = 0 and b + x = 0. We change the coordinates from the original indices (a, x, b) to (j, x, l), j := a + x, l := b + x. The constraints in (18) now read as
where
In the remaining of this proof we consider j fixed, while l, x are free to move within I. This corresponds to moving the indices in the rectangular region defined by the blue and green patches in Figures 3, 4 . Observe that for j = n it must be l = x (since −x + l ≤ 0 and l − x ≥ 0) i.e. in the original coordinates b = 0, which represents the segment on the plane b = 0 with a + x = n. These indices already belong to I R . Thus, we consider the case j = n and divide the reasoning in two parts. a) Case of f (j + 1)w(j + 1) ≤ f (j)w(j).
The term f (j + 1)w(j + 1) − f (j)w(j) is non-positive and so the most binding constraint in (19) is obtained picking x as small as possible. In the following we fix l as well (recall that we have previously fixed j). This corresponds to considering points on a black line on the plane j =const in Figure 3 ). Since it must be x ≥ 0 and x ≥ j + l − n, for fixed j and l we set x = max{0, j + l − n}. In the following we show that these constraints are already included in (11).
-When j + l ≤ n i.e. when a + b + 2x ≤ n, we set x = 0. These indices correspond to points on the plane x = 0, (1 ≤ a + b ≤ n) bounding the pyramid and so they are already included in I R . -When j + l > n i.e. When a + b + 2x > n, we set x = j +l −n, i.e. a+b+x = n. These indices correspond to points on the plane a + b + x = n, and so they are included in I R too. b) Case of f (j + 1)w(j + 1) > f (j)w(j).
The term f (j + 1)w(j + 1) − f (j)w(j) is positive and so the most binding constraint in (19) is obtained picking x as large as possible. In the following (after having fixed j) we fix l as well (this means we are moving on a black line on the plane j =const in the Figure 4 ). Since it must be x ≤ l, x ≤ j and x ≤ j + l − 1, we set x = min{j, l}.
In the following we show that these constraints are already included in (11) . -When j ≤ l i.e. when a ≤ b, we set x = j i.e. a = 0. These indices correspond to points on the plane a = 0, (1 ≤ x + b ≤ k) and so they are included in I R . 10 The primal LP (10) 
for j + l > n and j, l ∈ [0, n], where we have used the same change of coordinates of the proof of Theorem 3 i.e. j = a + x = n − b, l = b + x = n − a. Thus, we conclude that (20) and (21) are sufficient to describe the constraints in (11) , and the result follows.
ii) First, observe that for j = 0, it must be l ∈ [n]. Additionally, note that the second set of constraints (those with j + l > n) is empty. The first set of constraints yields λ ≥ w(l) l 1 f (1)w (1) , and observe that any feasible λ must satisfy λ ≥ λ . Second, observe that for l = 0, it must be j ∈ [n]. Additionally, the second set of constraints (those with j + l > n) is empty. The first set of constraints yields µ ≥ λjf (j) for j ∈ [n].
In the following we show that the most binding constraint amongst all those in (12) is of the form µ ≥ αλ + β, with α ≥ 0 (i.e. the most binding constraint is a straight line in the (λ, µ) plane pointing north-east). Consequently, the best choice of λ so as to satisfy the constraints and minimize µ is to select λ as small as possible, i.e. λ = λ . See Figure 5 for an illustrative plot. As shown previously, the constraints with j = 0 are straight lines parallel to the µ axis, while the constraints with l = 0 are straight line of the form µ ≥ λjf (j) (and thus point north-east in the (λ, µ) plane). We are thus left to check the constraints with j = 0 and l = 0.
To do so, we prove that if one such constraint (identified by the indices (j, l)) has negative slope, the constraint identified with (j, 0) is more binding. Since the constraint (j, 0) is of the form µ ≥ jλjf (j) (and thus has non-negative slope), this will conclude the proof. We split the reasoning depending on wether 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n or j + l > n as the constraints in (12) have a different expression.
-Case of 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n: to complete the reasoning, in the following we assume that jf (j) − lf (j + 1) w(j+1) w(j) < 0, and show that the constraint (j, 0) is more binding i.e. that λjf (j) ≥ w(l) w(j) + λjf (j) − λlf (j + 1) w(j + 1) w(j) ,
